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PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON SOCIAL CHANGE 
SOME SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
HERBERT C. KELMAN 
Universit_y of Michigan, U S A  
L’ktude p ychologique des changements sociaux. ProblJmes scientifques 
e t  ithiques. - Les recherches psycho-sociologiques peuvent aider h comprendre 
comment faciliter des changements sociaux constructifs. Pour des raisons B la fois 
scientifiques et sociales, l’ttude du changement social prtsente un inttret commun 
pour les psychologues des pays avancis et de ceux qui le sont moins. De plus, 
elle requiert, pour &re efficace, un haut degrt de cooperation internationale. 
S’engager dans de telles ttudes soultve des probltmes fondamentaux tant du 
point de vue scientifique que du point de vue moral. Les probltmes scientifiques 
sont relatifs aux implications de telles recherches pour le dtveloppement de la 
discipline et le maintien de I’objectiviti scientifique : les itudes du changement 
social dans les pays en voie de dtveloppement peuvent rtellement contribuer. 
et d’une manitre irremplaGable, aux progrts de la psychologie sociale; l’objec- 
tiviti scientifique dipend, non de l’absence de valeurs priftrentielles, mais de 
la manitre dont le chercheur tient compte de ces valeurs. Les probltmes tthiques 
concernent essentiellement les relations du chercheur qui vient d‘une socittt 
industrielle pour faire des etudes dans un pays en voie de dtveloppement, avec 
les membres de la socittt d’accueil, et particulitrement, avec ses colltgues locaux. 
Quels sont les problkmes moraux qui risquent de se poser ? Imposer des valeurs 
ttrangkres, envahir des domaines privts, utiliser la recherche 1 des fins d‘espion- 
nage et d’intervention, exploiter le pays d’accueil, ditourner H son profit les 
chercheurs locaux de valeur. I1 est essentiel que s’itablissent des relations fondies 
sur la participation et la rkiprocitt, pour que les recherches interculturelles 
soient conduites de fason morale et pour que se diveloppe une mutuelle confiance. 
The world community is faced with the necessity of finding creative responses 
to the powerful forces of social change that are nudging the old order every- 
where. These forces are most pronounced and most obvious in the so-called 
developing parts of the world, where demands for political independence, 
economic development, and social reform are producing a pattern of change 
that is too rapid at some points, too slow at others. The forces toward social 
change, however, are by no means restricted to the developing countries. They 
manifest themselves wherever there are populations that have been excluded 
from effective participation in the political process, from a share in the benefits 
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of the national economy, and from meaningful roles within the social structure. 
Thus, for example, the civil rights struggle and the renewed awareness of the 
problem of poverty in the United States are part of this worldwide revolution 
of human rights. What can be done to meet the challenge posed by this revolution, 
to facilitate social change and to increase the likelihood that it will move in 
constructive directions ? What kinds of institutional arrangements can be fash- 
ioned that would improve the conditions of the masses of the population, that 
would be consistent with their fundamental human needs for security and dignity, 
and that would bring ever wider segments of the population into full partici- 
pation in their societies, politics, and economies ? What institutions and values 
might increase, within the population of a developing country, the sense of the 
legitimacy of its political regime, the feeling of national identity, the readiness 
for involvement in citizenship responsibilities, in economic enterprises, in popu- 
lation control programs, in other forms of social planning ? What techniques 
of change can be developed that would minimize the use of violence, the bruta- 
lization of the active and passive participants in the change process, and the 
predisposition to govern by coercion and repression ? How can change be intro- 
duced without destroying the existing culture patterns and values that provide 
meaning and stability to a people, while at the same time helping to build the 
new patterns and values that an urbanizing, industrializing, and ever-changing 
society requires if it is to remain human ? 
Any attempt to answer these questions requires the input of new ideas and 
new data, often, in fact, of entirely new perspectives and ways of thinking. 
Social psychology is clearly a relevant source of such new inputs, for all of the 
questions I posed have distinctly psychological components. Thus, the challenge 
presented by the forces toward social change is also a challenge to us. Can social- 
psychological research meet this challenge ? Can it contribute to the systematic 
analysis, to the understanding, and to the rational solution of the problems of 
social change ? That it cannot do so alone and that it cannot produce a grand 
and all-inclusive design for answering the questions goes without saying. But 
we do have concepts and methods that ought to be applicable and, in my view, 
we should be able to play a significant role in a many-sided effort to deal with 
these problems. Obviously relevant contributions can come from many kinds 
of social-psychological research, such as research on the short- and long-term 
consequences of different techniques of inducing attitude and behavior change, 
on the sources of resistance to change in individuals and communities, or on 
the psychological effects of rapid social change. The type of research I am speaking 
of here is basic research, although there are, of course, valuable and legitimate 
contributions that can come from applied research as well. It is basic in the sense 
that it is concerned with long-range issues rather than specific programs, and 
that it is designed to answer general questions rather than questions posed by 
specific operating agencies relevant to their particular missions. At the same 
time, I do not pretend that I am speaking of research that is neutral and inde- 
pendent of value preferences. The research is based on the assumption that social 
change is desirable. It is designed to contribute to the understanding (I) of ways 
to facilitate constructive change in the direction of meeting human needs and 
of expanding the participation of people all over the world in the political, 
economic, and social processes of their respective societies, and ( 2 )  of ways to 
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minimize the coercive, destructive, and psychologically disabling consequences 
of rapid social change. 
My central thesis is that our discipline ought to invest a major effort in research 
along these lines. On another occasion, I spoke of this type of research as a contri- 
bution to radical thinking about societal processes. It is radical because, in ana- 
lyzing social arrangements and alternative policies, “ it searches for causes and 
attempts to specify the conditions that define a given state of affairs ... [and] it 
asks what [these arrangements and policies] mean to concrete human beings ” 
(Kelman, 1965b, pp. 33-34). In short, it goes to the roots and recognizes that 
“ the root is man. ” My reasons for urging that we invest a major effort in research 
on social change are partly scientific. The investigation of these problems offers 
very special opportunities for theoretically significant research about social 
behavior, to which I shall return shortly. Aside from these scientific reasons, 
however, I also urge this line of research as a contribution to work on vital 
social issues. For social scientists in developing countries these issues are obviously 
at the heart of the problems faced by their societies. They are equally vital, 
however, for social scientists in the more fully industrialized nations. I have 
already mentioned the continuity between the problems of social change in 
developing and industrialized societies. Most highly industrialized societies, for 
example, contain within them pockets of poverty - regions that are economically 
less developed -, ethnic or cultural minorities that are not fully integrated into 
the opportunity systems and the political life of the country, and internal conflicts 
that inhibit growth and integration. Moreover, these issues are vital for social 
scientists in industrialized nations for the simple reason that the problems of 
social change and development, wherever they may occur, are world problems. 
We all share in the responsibility and we are all confronted by the necessity to deal 
with these problems for both moral and prudential reasons. The welfare of all is 
everyone’s concern, and in this increasingly interdependent world the fate of 
one nation is inextricably linked with the fate of all others. Thus, we all have 
a responsibility to contribute to the development of broader perspectives for 
viewing the process of social change, and this is precisely what social science 
research can accomplish. 
For both scientific and social reasons, then, the study of social change is of 
mutual interest to psychologists in both more and less developed countries. 
This convergence of interest should provide the necessary motivation for coope- 
rative endeavors in this area. Furthermore, a high degree of cooperation between 
these two groups is essential if research is to proceed effectively, because of our 
mutual interdependence. On the one hand, problems that we wish to investigate 
and the detailed knowledge of the nature of these problems and their social and 
cultural context reside in the developing countries. On the other hand, the human 
and material resources for investigating these problems are more fully developed 
in the industrialized nations, where trained research personnel, accumulated 
research experience, research facilities, and research funds are far more readily 
available. There is thus clearly both a basis for international cooperation in 
research on social change and a strong necessity for organizing such cooperative 
efforts. In urging, then, that we place psychological research on social change 
high on our professional agenda, I would urge as a corollary that this research 
be built, as indeed it must be built, on international cooperation. 
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As we begin to think about mounting such an effort, there are some basic 
scientific and ethical questions that we must consider. What are the implications 
of this kind of effort for the development of psychology, particularly social 
psychology, as a discipline, and what special problems of scientific objectivity 
does it raise? What are the ethical implications of research on social change 
in developing countries and what barriers do these create to cooperation among 
psychologists from the less and more developed countries? The rest of my 
remarks will be devoted to a discussion of these scientific and ethical issues and 
of their further implications for the way in which cooperation in research on 
social change must be organized. 
SCIENTIFIC IMPLICATIONS 
Development of the discipline. Is there a danger that attention to the study of 
social change might distract psychologists from their primary task and might 
impede the advancement of psychology as a science ? It is my contention that 
the study of social change is by no means incompatible with the development 
of our discipline. As a matter of fact, I would guess that just the opposite holds 
true for the growth of psychology within developing countries themselves, 
Research that is relevant to pressing social problems is most likely to gain support 
within these societies, given their limited resources. Moreover, problems of 
social change can probably provide the most exciting opportunities for signi- 
ficant research in this setting and capture the imagination of the most promising 
students. Thus, this kind of emphasis is most likely to contribute to the growth 
of psychology in developing countries, by promoting acceptance for it, by 
demonstrating its relevance, and by stimulating significant psychological research. 
With time it would then become possible for psychological research on a variety 
of other problems to gain increasing support. 
Two important qualifications are in order here. The favorable development 
that I am predicting would be far less likely to materialize if we make exaggerated 
claims about the immediate and direct relevance of psychological research to 
problems of social change. These claims cannot be sustained and would only 
discredit us. A large part of the value of psychological research in this area rests 
on its cumulative effect and on its contribution, along with other sources of 
knowledge, to basic thinking about the processes of social change. By the same 
token, psychology as a discipline would be far less likely to advance if its potential 
contributions to problems of social change became narrowly defined, in terms 
of answering specific operational questions of various agencies involved in one 
or another aspect of social change. I do not question the value and importance 
of such applied research, but this is not at the heart of the effort that I am ad- 
vocating. If psychological research on social change is to gain support within de- 
veloping countries and at the same time contribute to the development of the 
discipline, we will have to stress that basic research, even though it may not 
answer certain immediate operational questions, may be more fruitful in the 
final analysis than applied research that narrowly focuses on problems of the 
moment. Such research may build the framework for fundamental answers 
to long-range problems, and may be highly relevant to problems that are likely 
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to arise in the future but have not yet been recognized by policy-makers. In 
short, we will have to demonstrate what I believe to be true : that theoretical 
research, and the development of the discipline in which it is embedded, can 
have important practical implications, although these may not always be readily 
apparent, particularly if one takes a short-range view. Going beyond the question 
of the advancement of psychology in developing countries, what is the probable 
impact of concerted efforts in the study of social change on the further advan- 
cement of psychological, and particularly social-psychological, theory and research 
in general? It should be evident from my emphasis on theoretical problems 
that what I am proposing is not a distraction of the social psychologist from his 
role in basic research, but one way of carrying out this role. Not only is a concern 
with facilitation of social change and with the social problems surrounding it 
compatible with basic research, but indeed there are some interesting and signi- 
ficant theoretical problems for which such a starting-point may actually represent 
the most productive way of carrying out basic research (f. Tajfel, 1966). Research 
that addresses itself to such broad questions as, for example, " How can economic 
development be facilitated in highly traditional, agricultural societies ? " or 
" How can the psychological and social dislocations resulting from rapid social 
change be minimized and counteracted ? " can certainly be a source of important 
theoretical advances that would not derive from studies formulated in more 
neutral terms and carried out in more antiseptic settings. 
From a methodological point of view, there is a special type of opportunity 
that research in developing countries can offer to the theoretically oriented social 
psychologist. This opportunity is linked to the very occurrence of major and 
rapid changes within these societies. It becomes possible to observe social change 
and related phenomena in extreme form and in the process of emergence. Because 
of the discontinuity and the rapidity with which these changes occur, it is some- 
times possible to approximate a before- and after-design, that is, to obtain measure- 
ments before the introduction of some major innovation and after it has taken 
its course. The effects of certain variables, whose history is known almost in its 
entirety, can thus be observed in detail and in relative isolation from contami- 
nating factors. Even if it is difficult to pin down specific causal connections, it 
is possible to observe the development of certain new values, beliefs, or social 
institutions. For example, my own research on national role conceptions and 
nationalist ideology can benefit greatly from observations carried out in new 
nations where the sense of national identity is often just in the process of emer- 
gence. Another special type of opportunity that research in developing coun- 
tries can offer to the theoretically oriented social psychologist is that it can extend 
the range of cultures in which theoretical propositions can be put to the test. 
For example, it ought to be possible to test hypotheses about the determinants 
of different reactions to social change, of different processes of acceptance and 
diffusion of change, or of differences in capacity to adjust to rapid societal trans- 
formations, by comparing societies that vary along certain relevant cultural 
dimensions. Cross-cultural comparisons enable us to check the generality of pro- 
positions that have been tested in a single culture and to develop theoretical 
models that can encompass contradictory findings in different cultural contexts 
(d. Tajfel, I 966). Developing countries offer unique opportunities for compa- 
rative research, not only because they provide cultural contexts different from 
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those in which social-psychological research has generally been carried out, but 
also because they often contain a wide diversity of cultures within relatively 
small geographical units. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, societies differing 
greatly with respect to some aspects of culture are, at the same time, charaaer- 
ized by many uniformities, both in culture and in conditions of life. It thus 
becomes possible to conduct natural experiments, to observe the effects of certain 
cultural differences on the process of social change and reactions to it with some 
degree of quasi-experimental control. 
Cross-cultural comparisons of this sort are significant, of course, not only 
for the study of social change, but also for the study of many other social and 
psychological processes. A useful dividend of participation in research on social 
change in developing countries may be that it gives the researcher access to 
comparative data on a wide variety of other phenomena, not directly related 
to social change as such. In some cases, these data may be obtained as part of 
the research design in a study of social change, but also analyzed for different 
purposes. For example, in studying the sources of differing reactions to social 
change, one might examine different patterns of child rearing, which in turn 
would provide a pool of data applicable to various other problems as well. 
In  other cases, it may be possible to add to the design of a study on social change 
some procedures relevant to a different problem. For example, at the end of an 
interview, respondents may be asked to give a few more minutes to a perceptual 
experiment. In yet other cases, an investigator’s colleagues in the host country 
may be more willing to help him carry out a completely unrelated study because 
he has been collaborating with them on research on social change which is of 
mutual interest. These are some possible indirect benefits that this kind of research 
may yield, above and beyond its inherent theoretical significance. 
Scientific objectivit_y. In describing the type of research I have in mind: I indi- 
cated not only that it was basic research, but also that it was rooted in certain 
value commitments. Implicit in the way research questions are formulated is the 
assumption that “ constructive social change ” - an admittedly vague phrase 
whose meaning, I hope, is clear from my earlier remarks - is desirable. The 
existence of such a value preference brings up another scientific issue : Is it pos- 
sible, under these conditions, to maintain the scientific objectivity of one’s 
research ? That value preferences affect the scientific process and are likely to 
introduce some distortions into it goes without saying. This is true of every 
line of research, certainly within social psychology, and even more certainly 
in an area marked by social significance. However, if we are going to do research 
on social change and other social problems, then we will have to live with this 
ambiguity and thoroughly re-examine our assumptions about scientific objectivity. 
The alternative would be to restrict ourselves arbitrarily to the study of pheno- 
mena less likely to engage basic values, to the extent that such phenomena exist 
at all in human psychology. 
Some social scientists might argue, perhaps, that one can enhance the scien- 
tific objectivity of research on social change if one deliberately excludes value 
considerations from the formulation of the research problem. According to this 
view, the researcher merely sets up the conditions for observing the relevant 
phenomena, and, by the use of objective methods, is able to do so in disinterested 
fashion. I submit that this view, if indeed anyone takes it, is based on self-delusion. 
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It is impossible to work in the area of social change, or in other areas pregnant 
with value considerations, such as the area of mental health, as a purely dis- 
interested observer, merely looking at whatever presents itself. Value preferences 
are inevitably built into the assumptions of the research design, which determine 
the questions that are to be asked, the events that are to be observed, the variables 
that are to be assessed, the categories in terms of which the data are to be orga- 
nized. I suspect that it is easiest to delude ourselves about the disinterested nature 
of our research when our assumptions reflect the dominant value preferences 
within our society. These value assumptions are so thoroughly built into the 
structure of reality, as we perceive it, that it does not occur to us to question 
them and to entertain the possibility of alternative assumptions. Thus, we have 
the anomalous situation that research rooted in the dominant values of the 
society is less likely to be questioned about its scientific objectivity and yet more 
likely to suffer from the lack of it. It is not only impossible to conduct basic 
research on socially significant problems in a value vacuum, but it is also not 
necessary to d.o so. To be maximally objective, research need not be value-free. 
There is no reason why the choice of problem cannot be based, as it generally is, 
on certain value preferences, and why the study cannot be designed to answer 
questions that have definite value implications. Thus, for example, questions 
about the conditions favorable to the development of mental health in an indi- 
vidual or about the procedures conducive to improvement in mentally ill patients 
are deeply immersed in value suppositions, yet they can be approached through 
objective research. In large part, of course, it is a matter of using methods that 
are objective, in the sense of being explicit, reliable, and replicable. As I have 
already pointed out, though, this does not prevent the intrusion of value prefer- 
ences into the assumptions on which the design is built, for the intrusion of 
values cannot be prevented. The issue is not whether the investigator has value 
preferences, but how he takes account of them. 
There are several essential steps that can help us take account of our values 
in the interest of maximizing the genuine objectivity of value-laden research : 
- I .  We must recognize and make explicit the value preferences underlying our 
research, in order to protect ourselves from unwittingly letting these slip into 
our assumptions and in order to allow others to reconstruct the basis of our 
design and conclusions. - 2. We must distinguish clearly between commitments 
to certain valued end-states and commitments to certain specific paths for achieving 
these states, particularly if these paths represent vested interests concerned with 
maintaining or achieving power within the society. Thus, for example, there is an 
important difference between research based on the assumption that social change 
is desirable and research based on the assumption that the program for social 
change developed by Party X is desirable. Similarly, there is an important differ- 
ence between research based on the assumption that political stability is desirable 
and research based on the assumption that a powerful military establishment as 
the protector of political stability is desirable. I would not argue that research 
based on commitment to specific paths is illegitimate, but it has a totally different 
scientific status in that it tends to limit the investigator’s ability to question basic 
value assumptions. It is thus essential to make such commitments explicit. The 
question of the auspices under which the research is done, to which I shall 
return later, becomes central here. - 3. We must be prepared to review our value 
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assumptions, to test the limits of these assumptions, and to explore the possi- 
bility and reasonableness of alternative assumptions. For example, if we assume 
that social change is desirable, we must question whether this is necessarily so, 
whether it is always so, and what further assumptions lie behind this preference. 
- 4. In this process of questioning our assumptions, we must be particularly alert 
to the possibility that our preferences are based on certain further assumptions 
about facts, which may in themselves be questionable or at least unquestioned. 
- 5 .We must constantly re-examine our definition of the desired end-state, whether 
it be mental health or constructive social change. If we fail to do so, we can easily 
slide into the assumption that our way of defining the concept is the way of defin- 
ing it, for example, that adjustment or freedom from symptoms i s  mental 
health, and thus allow our value preferences to slip out of our awareness and into 
the very definition of the criterion. 
The steps I have outlined are a mere hint of the kind of re-examination of the 
relationship between scientific objectivity and value commitments that I consider 
necessary. There is no easy solution to the problem of objectivity in research on 
socially significant problems. Certainly the avoidance of such research is an unsa- 
tisfactory answer, nor ought we to pretend that it is possible to conduct such 
research in disinterested fashion. One of the coming tasks for social psychology 
is to learn how to work in areas in which important values are engaged, how to 
combine social commitment with scientific integrity. 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
SO far, much of the research on social change in developing countries has 
been done by social scientists from industrialized nations, who have come into 
the country of concern, set up their project, collected their data, and then taken 
them home for analysis. This has been accomplished with varying degrees and 
kinds of cooperation on the part of social scientists in the host society. These 
activities of foreign scholars have often and understandably created suspicion and 
resentment among local social scientists and other elements in the society. If 
we are going to continue to do research in developing countries, and particularly 
if we hope to establish long-term collaborative relationships, we will have to 
become more sensitive to the concerns of members of the host societies and above 
all, to those of our colleagues and potential colleagues there. Dealing with the 
suspicion and resentment of the intruding scholar is not merely a public relations 
problem. There are, of course, many reasons for these reactions, and no doubt 
some of them can be ascribed to the sensitivities of intellectuals in developing 
countries. But to the largest extent, I submit, these problems are rooted in the 
ethical ambiguities inherent in the situation of the North American or European 
scholar coming into a developing country to carry out his research. I would like 
to describe five issues around which resentment and suspicion may focus, point 
to the ethical concern that each brings into play, and then say something about 
possible ways of arranging the relationship between the visitor and his hosts 
that might reduce ethically questionable behavior and the resentments that 
follow upon it. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON SOCIAL CHANGE 309 
Imposition foreign valtles. The problem of imposing foreign values is endemic 
to research on change, wherever it is conducted, particularly if the research is 
linked to an action program designed to induce change, or if it attempts to 
develop specific recommendations for facilitating change (6 Kelman, I 96 5 a). 
Planned change is typically based on certain values of the change agent, which 
are not fully shared by the target population. The ethical implications of this 
state of affairs are more or less acute, depending on the nature of the influence 
process used. In any event, however, such change does involve at least some 
threat to the existing values of the target population and a certain amount of 
tampering with these values. Even when the change agent is a member of the 
same society, the values governing his influence attempt are likely to be somewhat 
foreign to those of the target population because usually the two represent 
different social classes. When the change agent is a member of a foreign society, 
the problem clearly takes on more serious proportions. The investigator must 
keep himself constantly aware of the danger of such imposition. He must develop 
an informed respect for the people who are being investigated or influenced, for 
their values and their way of life, understood insofar as possible within their 
own terms. He must repeatedly question his assumptions about the desirability 
of the changes he is promoting : perhaps these changes do not justify the extent 
to which they disrupt existing values. He must review the methods for inducing 
change that are employed from the point of view of the degree of manipulation 
and imposition that they represent. When the foreign scholar works closely 
with local counterparts, which is generally true in those situations in which the 
research is tied to an action program, then the problem is lessened, since the local 
colleague would be more sensitive to the general values of the society that are 
being threatened and to potentially disruptive consequences. Even in this case, 
however, the foreign investigator cannot escape the responsibility of confronting 
the problem of imposition of foreign values. Because of the class differences 
that I have already mentioned, the local scholar may himself not be fully aware 
and appreciative of the values of the target population. In fact, it is conceivable 
that an outsider, because of his distance and lack of indoctrination in class- 
based assumptions, may at times have a sharper appreciation of the special charac- 
ter of the target population than his local colleague. I can well imagine, for 
example, that a foreign social scientist might learn things about the values of 
lower-class Negroes in the United States of which most white middle-class 
North American scholars simply have no conception. 
Invasion of privay. The problem of invasion of privacy, which confronts 
social research in general, takes on a special character when the investigator 
is a representative of a more developed society. Members of the host society 
may resent the implication that their country is being looked upon as a specimen 
and studied because of the " quaintness " of its primitive culture and the " back- 
wardness " of its social life. It ought to be possible to persuade our colleagues, 
and through them other members of their society, that we do not regard them 
with this kind of patronizing superiority if, indeed, we bring to our research a 
deep respect for the integrity of the culture that we have come to observe. Such 
resentments can also be overcome to the extent to which the research is clearly 
placed in a comparative context, so that it becomes quite apparent that our 
interest is not in the oddities of a particular culture but in the way in which 
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different cultures handle problems common to all of them. I t  is particularly 
important to the development of a cooperative relationship that we not only 
communicate our awareness of the continuity between more and less developed 
societies with respect to problems of social change, but that we also build oppor- 
tunities for mutual exposure into our research plans. Thus, if we are interested 
in studying tribal conflicts in Africa, we should try to provide an opportunity 
for our African colleagues to study race relations in the United States. Similarly, 
if we are interested in studying the social consequences of rapid urbanization 
in Asia, we should try to provide an opportunity for our Asian colleagues to 
make direct observations in the slum areas of US cities. Such reciprocal arran- 
gements would help to overcome the potential resentment that one-sided expo- 
sure might arouse. At the same time, they would provide excellent opportunities 
for training young investigators and enhance the contributions of colleagues 
from developing countries to the larger research enterprise. 
Use of research for purposes of intel'ligence or intervention. Suspicion about the use 
of social research as a cover for espionage or intervention in foreign countries 
arose dramatically in the now famous case of Project Camelot (cf. Horowitz, 
1965 ; Silvert, 1965). While there are no indications whatsoever that either espio- 
nage or intervention was involved in this case, it helps to bring into focus some 
of the ethical problems arising out of the political relationship between the 
foreign scholar's country and the host country. I do not need to dwell on the 
obvious point that no social scientist ought to participate, directly or indirectly, 
in any operation that uses social science research as a front for intelligence work 
or intervention in another country. If he engages in such activities, he is not 
working as a social scientist and he certainly must not pretend to be doing so. 
I would also regard it as clearly inconsistent with scientific ethics for a social 
scientist to work for an academic or research organization that serves as a cover 
for intelligence operations, even if he himself does not participate in them, since 
he is allowing his scientific standing to be used to legitimize these activities. 
The problem, however, goes beyond the obvious and ethically straightfor- 
ward question of whether a piece of social science research is an act of interven- 
tion in disguise. Given the nature of the relationship between the United States 
and Latin America, for example, a perfectly legitimate study, carried out by 
honest investigators, may in subtle ways reflect an interventionist policy and 
contribute to it. This may happen, as it seemed to happen in the case of Project 
Camelot, when a study, though free and independent in its operations, is carried 
out for a military client and uses military policy objectives as its frame of refe- 
rence and source of assumptions (Horowitz, 1965). The important question 
that the social scientist must ask himself when he enters into a foreign country 
to do research on politically sensitive matters is whether he is truly an autonom- 
ous agent, not only in the sense of being free to choose his own methods, but 
also in the sense of being free to question certain basic assumptions and to 
entertain a totally new set of assumptions, in other words, in the sense of being 
free to function as a scientist. He must ask himself whether the auspices under 
which he is doing the research are such that he is really bound, even in the absence 
of an explicit contract to that effect, to take a particular perspective as his point 
of departure and to continue within its terms. To the extent that he is, he is not 
really operating as an autonomous investigator and should not present himself 
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as such. As Silvert (1965) points out, " the peculiar attribute and unique scientific 
virtue of the university-affiliated social scientist is his freedom. Once abridged, 
for whatever reason, then the people relying on his objectivity are in serious 
danger of accepting a misrepresented product ... " @. 224). The crucial issue, 
it should be noted, is not the sponsorship of the research or the source of funds, 
but the nature of the explicit or implicit contract under which the funds are 
obtained. 
It is a good general rule to be very clear about both the source of funds and 
the nature of the contract, in order to allow colleagues in the host society to 
make their own estimates about the political implications of the research and 
in order to allay their understandable suspicions. It would be valuable if, beyond 
sharing this kind of information as well as information about the purposes and 
premises of the research, the foreign investigator engaged in close, frank consul- 
tation with colleagues in the host country. This would enable him not only to 
allay their suspicions and answer their questions, and to learn through them about 
the suspicions and questions that others have, but also to discover certain implicit 
assumptions that he might have been making unwittingly. Even more desirable 
would be full participation of colleagues in the host country in the formulation, 
conduct, and analysis of the research, not as consultants or specialists, but as 
collaborators, sharing in basic decisions. Under these circumstances, i t  is less 
likely that subtle reflections of an interventionist policy would slip into the 
research design. 
Exploitation of the host country. The researcher from an industrialized country 
often engages in activities that his colleagues in the host country regard as exploita- 
tive and that thus arouse their resentment. The foreign scholar may come into 
the country, arrange to get help from local social scientists in the collection of 
his data, give them fair compensation for their help, and then go home with 
his data to analyze them and write them up. He is too busy and task-oriented 
and thus not sufficiently thoughtful to view these activities as exploitation. The 
local scholar, however, resents the fact that he is working on problems of others, 
without advancing his own career and without being left more capable to initiate 
research on his own. He sees the foreign scholar as " an exporter of data " 
(Silvert, 1965, p. 227), who takes all that is valuable out of the rountry to use it 
for his own ends. Such feelings of exploitation are less likely to develop if research 
collaborators in the host country are not merely assigned a specific task in the 
project and trained to perform it. To the extent to which participation in the 
project contributes to their general training and provides them with broad 
experience, they will come away from it feeling more capable to initiate their 
own research on problems of their own choosing. Such an outcome is most 
likely to occur if colleagues from the developing countries have maximum 
opportunity to participate in all phases of the research, including the definition 
of the problem and the initial planning. 
Aside from the ethical problem and the feeling of resentment engendered 
by the more exploitative relationship, the growth of social psychology as a 
discipline within the developing countries is at issue here. The growth of the 
discipline can be advanced only if the capabilities of personnel in developing 
countries for initiating and carrying out their own research relevant to their 
own interests are enhanced. Research projects organized by North American 
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and European investigators are particularly likely to contribute to this end if they 
are carried out within the context of a training program. That is, if investigators 
from other countries come not merely to carry out a specific project, but to help 
set up or to contribute to an ongoing training program - along the lines of the 
program being developed by Syracuse University and Makerere College (Kam- 
pala) under the direction of Marshall Segall - they are more likely to make a long- 
range contribution, while at the same time pursuing their research interests. 
It is important to stress, in this connection, that an arrangement that is one-sided 
in the other direction, that is, one whereby the North American or European 
psychologist comes to a developing country entirely for the purpose of serving 
that country, without viewing this experience as relevant to his own research 
interests, is also untenable in the long run. A cooperative relationship in which 
one side is always the benefactor and the other the beneficiary will not be accep- 
table for long to either side. The most promising relationship is a reciprocal one, 
in which participation by colleagues from the developing countries enhances 
their own capabilities, while at the same time advancing in concrete ways the 
research goals of the visiting scholar. 
Diversion oflocal research talent. The foreign scholar is usually in a better position 
to offer financial and other inducements and may thus divert local research talent 
to work on his problems. Members of the host society may resent the use of their 
limited human resources for research on the theoretical problems of the outside 
scholar rather than on the pressing immediate problems faced by the society. 
To the extent to which this resentment is based on a perceived conflict between 
theoretical research and research that has social utility, I would argue, as I have 
already done earlier, that social-psychological research certainly can have and 
typically does have practical implications, even if they are not immediately ap- 
parent. We can respond to the concern about the social relevance of psychological 
research by integrating our theoretical interests with research that takes the 
problems of developing societies as its starting point, and by demonstrating 
convincingly that some theoretical studies that have no obvious immediate 
utility do have long-range relevance to these problems. Beyond that, the remedy 
that I have already mentioned several times is equally applicable here : If colleagues 
from the host society participate fully in the formulation of the research, then 
there is a greater likelihood that it will in fact be relevant to the special problems 
of their societies as they see them. 
CONCLUSION 
Most of the ethical problems that arise in the relationship between social 
scientists from more and less developed societies can be linked to the pseudo- 
imperialist character that these relationships sometimes take on. While I doubt 
that most North American social scientists have imperialistic values or character 
structures, the realities of their own situations and of the situations into which 
they come tend to cast them into imperialistic roles. Many of us have assumed, 
implicitly and without questioning, that the other society is simply there for us 
to research upon it, and that we can take what we wish from it, as long as we 
pay the fair market price. In the process, we have too often displayed a lack of 
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respect for the values of the society, the sensitivities of its members, the dignity 
of our respondents, and to personal and professional aspirations of our collea- 
gues. Such an attitude simply will not do. The sine p a  non, it seems to me, for 
coming to grips with these ethical problems, and by the same token for extending 
psychological research on social change, is the development of patterns of truly 
participatory and reciprocal cooperation. We need to experiment more actively 
with exchanges that involve mutual exposure, with collaborative research projects 
built on full participation and reciprocal benefit, with international institutes for 
research and training, with closer integration between research and training 
efforts, with international boards to review projects that may be politically 
sensitive. Needless to say, the degree and type of international cooperation 
will have to differ from project to project, but the participatory and reciprocal 
relationship must become our norm, the background against which ethical 
conduct can be defined and mutual trust can develop. 
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